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The NAFTA Trucking Dispute with
Mexico: Problem? What Problem?
Michael R. Skahan*
I. Introduction.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) started in January of 1994 with
much fanfare, but it is now in danger of stumbling and falling a mere six years after its
launch. An ongoing dispute over cross-border trucking provisions scheduled to go into
effect in December of 1995, but not yet implemented, has left NAFTA's motor carrier pro-
visions stuck in neutral. This comment discusses the trucking dispute under NAFTA
between the United States and Mexico and provisions for opening land transportation in
the NAFTA Implementation Act. Part II begins by providing some historical background
of the agreement itself; it then summarizes the impact of NAFTA to date and NAFTA's
motor carrier provisions. Part III discusses the origins of the issues that are fundamental
to the trucking dispute between Mexico and the United States, as well as the current sta-
tus of the dispute. Finally, Part IV examines the effects of the trucking dispute on NAFTA
as a whole and its implications for the future of the agreement. The conclusion reached is
that the current administrations of the United States and Mexico are not under enough
political pressure to cause a resolution of the dispute.
II. Overview of NAFTA.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
NAFTA,' entered into force between Mexico, Canada, and 'the United States on
January 1, 1994,2 culminated the negotiations begun in August of 1990 by the Bush
* Michael R. Skahan is a J.D. Candidate for the Class of 2000 of the Southern Methodist
University School of Law. This article is an adaptation from a comment presented by Mr.
Skahan as a member of the International Law Review Association of SMU (ILRA). As a mem-
ber of the ILRA, Mr. Skahan has served as a Staff Editor and as a Managing Editor for The
International Lawyer.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 3311, 19 U.S.C. § 3311
(1994) [hereinafter Implementation Act]. The conditions for entry into force of NAFTA are
intended to ensure that benefits are not extended to Mexico or Canada by the United States
unless and until reciprocal benefits are granted to the United States. Mexico, in particular, was
called upon to revise its procedures to be fairer under chapter 19 of NAFTA.
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administration. 3 On August 12, 1992, President Bush announced that a comprehensive
agreement had been reached by the three countries, 4 marking the first comprehensive
free trade agreement negotiated by the United States with a developing country, Mexico. 5
Canada and Mexico are the first and third largest trading partners of the United States,
respectively, and leaders of NAFTA countries predicted the treaty would lead to an expan-
sion of that trade. 6 The Bush White House envisioned NAFTA as a precursor to a free
trade area encompassing the entire Western Hemisphere, eventually expanding to include
Chile, Argentina, and other countries in the region. 7
For years, Mexico employed a system of high tariffs and licensing requirements to
encourage internal industrial development and import substitution. President Salinas,
and President de la Madrid before him, began opening Mexican markets to the outside
world and implementing significant economic reforms. 8 Mexico's inclusion in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 9 began a program of tariff reduction.' 0
In the period between Mexico's joining GATT and NAFTA negotiations, bilateral trade
increased dramatically. I 1
NAFTA created a free trade area including the United States, Canada, and Mexico. In
accordance with GATT rules, tariffs are eliminated in the respective free trade areas dur-
ing a transition period.12 An ambitious plan, NAFTA has the goal of eliminating barriers
to trade in agriculture, manufacturing, and services. 13 NAFTA also intends to eventually
remove investment restrictions, protect intellectual property rights, and for the first time
in U.S. trade history, directly address environmental concerns.14 However, the current
trucking dispute could sour the spirit of free trade and cooperation if it goes unresolved
and inhibit the implementation of these other provisions.
3. See John P. Sweeney, Latin America, in Issues 1998, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS 518.
"Formal negotiations began in June 1991 after Congress extended through May 1993 the Fast
Track procedures originally enacted in the Trade Act of 1974...." The Trade Act authorizes
"the Administration to submit an agreement with implementing legislation for an up-or-down
vote." See White House Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 28 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1424 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet: The North
American Free Trade Agreement].
4. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-361 (I), at 6 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552, 2556.
5. See Sweeney, supra note 3.
6. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-361(I), at 8. In 1992, bilateral trade between Mexico and the United
States totaled $76 billion while trade between Canada and the United States totaled $200 bil-
lion. NAFTA was estimated to create the largest integrated market in the world with a com-
bined economy of $6.5 trillion and 370 million people. See id.
7. See Sweeney, supra note 3.
8. See White House Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 3.
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
10. See White House Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 3.
11. See id. U.S. exports to Mexico rose from $12.4 billion to $33.3 billion between 1986 and 1991,
doubling the rate of growth for U.S. exports to the rest of the world. Agricultural exports rose
173% to $3 billion, consumer goods 300% to $3.4 billion, and capital goods to $11.3 billion





B. IMPACT OF NAFTA TO DATE.
There is no clear-cut picture on the impact NAFTA has made on its member coun-
tries over the past five years. Large innovative producers that adapted to changing market
conditions have benefited under NAFTA. 15 Others that have not adapted have suffered
negative effects since NAFTA's inception.1 6 One thing is clear: since NAFTA was signed on
January 1, 1994, overall trade between Mexico and the United States has ballooned from
$80 billion to $200 billion in 1998.17 Mexico has become the United States' second largest
trading partner. 18 For example, Mexico is now the top exporter of apparel into the United
States. 19 The apparel industry's contribution to Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP)
increased 250 percent. 20 Exports from Mexico to the United States in the first eight
months of 1998 were 145 percent higher than those during the same time frame in 1993,
the year before NAFTA took effect. 21 Such a dramatic increase in trade has had a major
beneficial effect on the struggling Mexican economy.22 However, in some Mexican states
such as Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Veracruz, millions of Mexicans have been pushed below the
poverty line.2 3 Now, more than half of Mexico's population is in poverty.24 Opponents of
NAFTA, such as the AFL-CIO, use statistics to estimate that between 300,000 and 400,000
American jobs have gone to Mexico since 1994.25 Opponents also contend that NAFTA
does not adequately protect worker safety and the unionization rights of Mexican work-
ers.26 In contrast, the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce claims that 1.7 million
export-related jobs have been created in the United States since 1993.27 The Chamber
claims that NAFTA is largely responsible for this increase. 28
C. MOTOR CARRIER PROVISIONS.
One of NAFTA's goals is to eliminate barriers to trade in agriculture, manufacturing,
and services. A key element to achieving this goal is the implementation of NAFTA's motor
carrier provisions. The motor carrier provisions provide for a gradual phase-in that would
allow Mexican trucks free access to the highways of the United States.29 In order for this to
occur, a moratorium imposed upon Mexican motor carriers by the Bus Regulatory Reform
15. See Adolfo Garza, Five Years Into NAFTA, Pact's Merits Still Debated, One Thing's Sure: Only the
Strong Survive, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 3, 1999, at 23A.
16. See id.
17. See Geoffrey Mohan, Impact Debated as NAFTA Turns Five, Mexico-U.S. Trade Soars to $200
Billion Since Agreement, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleve., OH), Jan. 3, 1999, at IG.
18. See Garza, supra note 15.
19. Mohan, supra note 17.
20. See id.
21. See Alfredo Corchado & Laurence Iliff, NAFTA Stirs Up Internal Troubles, Some Industries
Flourishing, Others Ailing Under Trade Pact, Series: Five Years of NAFTA: Mexico's Mixed Results,








29. See NAFTA, supra note 1.
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Act of 198230 would have to be lifted by the United States.31 NAFTA laid out a schedule for
the Presidential orders that would be needed to lift the moratorium on new grants of operat-
ing authority. This schedule calls for such orders upon entry into force of NAFTA for
Mexican charter and tour bus companies and for an amended moratorium that allows
Mexican trucking companies access to the four border states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,
and California) and permits the establishment of companies to distribute international cargo
within the United States three years after signing of NAFTA (December 17, 1995). The
schedule also provides for such orders for Mexican regular route bus companies three years
after entry into force and for the provision of cross-border trucking services throughout the
United States six years after entry into force. 32
III. The U.S.-Mexico Trucking Dispute.
A. ORIGINS.
In order for NAFTA to proceed on schedule, President Clinton needed to order an
amended moratorium allowing Mexican trucking companies access to the four border
states and providing for the establishment of companies to distribute international cargo
within the United States by December 18, 1995. However, on that day, Transportation
Secretary Federico Pena announced that the United States would not process Mexican
trucking companies' applications for operating authority.33 The Secretary cited safety
concerns and inadequate harmonization between Mexican and U.S. trucking standards as
the reasons for the Clinton administration's decision to override NAFTAs trucking provi-
sions.34 Fears were also raised that the new trucking rules would increase the illegal drug
trade from Mexico. 35 Pena further explained that the Administration wanted to imple-
ment NAFTA correctly and that the preparation for the border opening to date had not
been adequate. 36 Under the agreement, Mexican trucks would have been able to apply to
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for authority to travel freely into California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.37 Pena also said that although the ICC would accept
30. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 10922(m) (1994) (repealed 1995). The Act
was passed to provide for more effective regulation of motor carriers of passengers, but it had
important provisions that affected the trucking industry.
31. See 140 CONG. REC. S14,476-77 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1994), Report of Intentions Relative to the
North American Free Trade Agreement-Message from the President-PM 154.
32. See id.
33. See David E. Sanger, U.S. and Mexico Postpone NAFTA on Truck Crossings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1995, at B1O.
34. See Helene Cooper, Shift Into Reverse: Ban on Mexican Trucks in U.S. Interior Shows Rise of
Protectionism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at AI0; Pamela C. Schmidt, NAFTA: The Effects of the
Motor Carrier Provisions on the Future of the Agreement, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 505,
508 (1997).
35. See David E. Sanger, Dilemma for Clinton on NAFTA Truck Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at A36.
36. See Debra Beachy, U.S. Halts Expansion of NAFTA Trucking, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1995, at Al.




Mexican applications, it would not certify them until this dispute was settled.3 8 What was
portrayed as a minor delay has now lasted nearly four full years. 39
For weeks leading up to the December implementation date, the Clinton administra-
tion was under strong pressure from labor unions (most notably the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters) and Democratic leaders to keep the current rules in place.40
The pre-NAFTA rules allowed Mexican and American trucks to only travel approximately
twenty miles into each other's country.41 As the deadline approached, officials from
Mexico and the United States carried on intense negotiations concerning backing away
from the new NAFTA provision. 42 The culmination of these negotiations was the
announcement of the delay by Secretary Pena.4 3
B. DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE NAFTA MOTOR CARRIER PROVISIONS.
Differing truck safety standards are one of the greatest obstacles to successful imple-
mentation of the motor carrier provisions. Many citizens and lobbying groups oppose the
motor carrier provisions, arguing that the increase of heavy trucks on the highway is like-
ly to lead to increased pollution, increased wear and tear on the nation's highways and
infrastructure, and increased highway injuries and fatalities. 4 4 The NAFTA harmoniza-
tion process called for member countries to make their standards compatible within a
three-year period.45 Critics suggest that the harmonization process is impractical and will
only result in lower standards in the United States.46 In fact, one of the reasons cited by
the Clinton administration for not opening the border to Mexican trucks was the difficul-
ty of finding compatible standards. 47
Another area of difficulty is the ability of the nation's transportation systems to han-
dle the increased traffic associated with NAFTA. 48 The facilities at the border with Mexico
are adequate and should remain so for the foreseeable future; however, NAFTA has put
increased demands on the crossings. 49 The General Services Administration (GSA) spent
$364.5 million on a capital improvement program designed to accommodate up to 8.4
million trucks annually that might drive through southern border crossing facilities. 50 In
1992, for example, only 2.3 million trucks entered the United States from Mexico. 51
The biggest obstacles to border crossing are the long waits that truckers and trains
face. The debate over infrastructure has raged since NAFTA was announced. Some esti-
38. See Sanger, supra note 33.
39. See id.
40. See Sanger, supra note 35.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Greenberger, supra note 37.




48. See Assessing Border Crossings and Transportation Corridors for North American Trade, 12 MEX.
TRADE & L. REP. 25 (1993 ) [hereinafter Border Crossings).
49. See id. at 27.
50. See id. at 28.
51. See id.
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mate the extra expenses associated with squeezing the vast amount of trade through bor-
der choke points at $2.5 billion per year.5 2 One U.S. auto industry study put the price tag
on delays for wasted time in Laredo at $3 million annually.5 3 Cole-Haan, a Nike sub-
sidiary, recently had to pull a shipment of goods off a truck that was stuck in Mexico for
five days and use Federal Express to transport them because a retailer was already running
ads for the products.5 4 Proponents of increased infrastructure spending claim that there
are not enough bridges, rails, and docks to handle the goods, and that existing facilities
are often poorly located. 55
Others claim that the problem is not how many bridges there are, but how they are
used.56 Some of the recommendations that have been made include opening customs sta-
tions during off-peak hours so trucks don't have to compete with daytime commuter
traffic, using an electronic customs document filing system (eliminating the need to deal
with a customs broker at the border), and allowing free access for Mexican and American
trucking companies in each other's countries. 57
Arterial highways, on the other hand, might not fare as well. These highways leading
to and from border crossing sites are part of the infrastructure supporting border
approach and are under stress from the increased traffic levels. The GSA improvements
previously mentioned only affect the facilities at border crossings that conduct inspec-
tions and handle traffic. 58
Communities surrounding border-crossing facilities have unique problems arising
from the traffic congestion at these sites. Traffic can cause spillover congestion on local
roads, lower air quality, increased safety risks due to heavy vehicle traffic, and increased
wear on highway infrastructure. 59
A large part of the delays at border crossings are unrelated to infrastructure, however.
60
The volume of trade, coupled with complex inspection requirements, traffic management
problems, and cargo clearance procedures contribute to the amount of time it takes for a
truck to clear the border.61 Increased staffing could possibly alleviate some of the delays, but
52. See Anna Wilde Mathews, NAFTA Reality Check: Trucks, Trains, Ships Face Costly Delays, WALL
ST. J., June 3, 1998, at Al (quoting James Giermanski, Texas A&M International University in
Laredo).
53. See id. The costs that are passed on to consumers, typically transportation costs, account for
five to ten percent of retail prices.
54. See id. The resultant cost was more than twice what it would have been for relying solely on
truck transport.
55. See id. The article points to several examples of delays such as freight trains that have been
backed up into Kansas waiting their turn to pass through a one-track crossing and several ships
at anchor waiting their turn for scarce dock space at a Mexican port. Truck crossing backups
in Laredo have stretched for as long as four to five miles, snarling downtown traffic. U.S.
truckers crowd local establishments while waiting, some even becoming regulars at a local golf
course.
56. See Michael Allen, More Bridges to Mexico? Maybe There Are Plenty, WALL ST. I., TEX. J., Nov.
17, 1993, at TI (quoting James Giermanski, Texas A&M International University in Laredo).
57. See id. (published prior to the unfolding of the current trucking dispute).





in the current budgetary environment, the dollars are hard to come by. Automated inland
customs clearing centers could also help smooth the border crossing process.
These automated systems, known as the North American Trade Automation Protocol
(NATAP), are designed to standardize all import-export information needed for trade
and then use electronic commerce to transmit information on the truck, driver, and cargo
to the border before he arrives.6 2 The system uses the Internet, small radio towers,
transponders on trucks, and an encrypted computer language to track cargo, vehicle, and
driver information as they travel. 63 The system has been used at the border cities of Otay
Mesa, California; Nogales, Arizona; El Paso, Texas; Detroit, Michigan; Buffalo, New York;
and Laredo, Texas. 64 San Antonio, Texas is the first non-border city to receive a prototype
of the system. The Free Trade Alliance San Antonio, a nonprofit civic agency, spearheaded
an effort to convert Kelly Air Force Base to an inland customs pre-clearance center.65
There is no U.S. Customs office in San Antonio, so Ryder Integrated Logistics will admin-
ister the program. 66 Most shippers rely on private customs brokers to manage their
trucks' passage through the border. The process requires extensive documentation and is
often plagued by lengthy cargo inspections that require the full unloading of a truck's
cargo.67 Federal officials say that NATAP will allow smaller importing and exporting
companies to go to the NATAP center in San Antonio to input customs declarations. This
would eliminate the need for the companies to purchase expensive computer equipment
or deal with paper filings at the border.68 Ryder claims that the system. cuts several hours
from its shipping time and eliminates drayage costs (typically $50 to $300 per load).6 9 It
is unclear whether the process laid out by NATAP's proponents will overcome entrenched
cultural and business obstacles. 70 But again, obtaining funding from Congress is the
largest obstacle to such streamlining efforts.
62. See Bill May, Trade Highway System Tests Face Delays, THE J. RECORD (Okla. City), Feb. 11, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 14385275.
63. See Bonnie Pfister, Short-Circuiting Short-Haulers: Electronic Cargo Monitoring System Paves
Way for Swifter Cross-border Commerce, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 31, 1997, at 3H,
available in 1997 WL 13202654. The article outlines NATAP's possible effect on the short-haul
trucking business in Texas.
64. See id.
65. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Freight Expectations: Laredo Has Little to Fear in Trucking Shake- Up, WALL ST. J.,
TEX. J., Aug. 12, 1998, at T1, available in 1998 WL 3505242. The Kelly facility is envisioned as a
warehousing, transportation, and logistics hub with air, rail, and trucking connections comparable
to Dallas. Kelly has four million square feet of warehouse space, a runway that can handle 747-size
aircraft, and a rail staging yard. The base reverts to civilian control in 2001.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Pfister, supra note 63.
69. See Opdyke, supra note 65. Ryder began testing the system in early 1998 from Kelly. The pro-
gram allowed trucks to drive directly to Nuevo Laredo, across the Mexican border from
Laredo. Drayage firms are used to ferry trailers from one side of the border to the other, where
a domestic carrier will pick up the load and take it to its final destination.
70. See id. A typical transfer would work as follows: a Mexican shipper or its customs broker
enters information (cargo, weight, trailer condition, and driver) into an electronic data inter-
face (EDIFAC) that is accessible to customs agents in all three NAFTA countries. The "paper-
less" computer document can be reviewed by Mexican and U.S. officials as it approaches the
border. A number is assigned and coded into the transponder attached to the truck's wind-
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In contrast, others argue that not much will change in border crossing towns like
Laredo. Powerful geographic, political, economic, and cultural factors protect the status
quo. 7 1 The existing infrastructure and business relationships already established would
work against programs like the San Antonio Kelly project. 72 Truck drivers' wallets may
also hurt the chances of the Kelly NATAP center. American drivers, typically paid by the
mile, are likely to drive as far as possible before transferring their cargo to another carrier.
Further, many trucking firms have expressed reluctance to send their drivers into Mexico,
even if the current restrictions are lifted. 73 A Laredo civic official may have said it best,
"It's not just what is most efficient, it's what makes everybody politically happy."74
C. SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.
Many opponents of NAFTA voiced concerns over increased commercial traffic as
well as the safety, environmental, and drug-trafficking risks that would naturally accom-
pany such an increase. 75 Officials from the border states warned the Administration that
Mexican trucks often fail to meet the requisite safety standards and that Mexican drivers
are not subject to hourly work limits, as American drivers are. 76 Additionally, Mexican
trucks routinely carry hazardous materials, such as toxic waste, corrosive chemicals, jet
fuel, and pesticides.77 The highways on which these trucks would operate also recently
removed the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit. 78 Administration officials had already
shield. The transponder signals radio antennas near and at the crossing point as it approaches.
Customs officials determine if the truck is cleared or whether it needs to be stopped for inspec-
tion. The approaching driver looks for a green light or red light and if he sees green he contin-
ues unimpeded through the border crossing. Another antenna picks up the transponder signal
after the truck has passed through the border and tells the computer system that the cargo has
been cleared. Supporters stress that this will also free up more inspectors to focus on anti-
smuggling inspections. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. Executives with some large trucking firms think that even if trade infrastructure moves
from the border, it is more likely to go to established trade hubs like Dallas or Houston where
firms already have regional freight yards.
73. See id. The author cites the trucking firms' fears concerning liability, language, and cultural
barriers. Consequently, cargo would have to be transferred to a Mexican long-haul trucking
firm, which likely would take place in Laredo. American firms already have significant invest-
ments in facilities there, and American drivers are generally paid by the mile. American drivers
will want to drive as far as possible before handing off the trailer. See id. (quoting Paul
Burgant, Executive Vice President of Marketing, J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc.).
74. See Pfister, supra note 63 (quoting Miguel Conchas, President of the Laredo Chamber of
Commerce).'
75. See Peter J. Cazmias, The U.S.-Mexican Trucking Dispute: A Product of a Politicized Trade
Agreement, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 349, 350 (1998) (citing Transportation Infrastructure and Safety
Impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1993: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103d
Cong. 114 (1993) (statement by Dennis Skelton, Vice President, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters)).
76. See Sanger, supra note 35. Surveys cited by the officials found that one in four Mexican trucks




addressed some of these concerns when the Implementation Act was moving through
Congress. 79 Only three weeks before the Clinton administration's decision not to open
the border, the ICC published its response to many common concerns. 80 Regarding dri-
ver certification, the ICC proposed four types of authorization that could be easily identi-
fied by law enforcement officials. 8 1 In response to safety concerns voiced by the
Teamsters, the ICC said that the national treatment requirements of NAFTA mandate that
the United States not impose substantially different standards on Mexican drivers as
American drivers.82 They also said that any motor carrier failing to meet the Department
of Transportation's safety fitness standards would have their authority revoked. 83 The
ICC continued by stating that Mexican carriers would be required to meet U.S. insurance
requirements and reciprocal access requirements. 84 It seems clear that Congress 85 and the
Clinton administration were aware of the political volatility of the safety issue as well.86
79. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-361(111), at 97-100 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2721, 2827-
30. Secretary Pena responded to a June 15, 1993, letter from Mr. Jack C. Thomas of Illinois
that expressed a variety of concerns over trucking aspects of NAFTA. See id. In particular,
Mexican trucks have a weight limit of 170,000 pounds and Canadian trucks are limited at
137,000 pounds, compared to 80,000 pounds for American trucks. See id. at 96 (citing letter
from Jack C. Thomas dated May 9, 1993). Mr. Thomas also voiced concerns over driver safety
regulations, noting that American drivers are limited to ten hours per day compared to thir-
teen hours and unlimited for Canadian and Mexican drivers respectively. See id. Further,
American drivers are subject to Commercial Drivers Licensing standards that ensure standard-
ized tests and training for hazardous materials, among others. See id. Mr. Thomas was con-
cerned about such standards for Canadian and Mexican drivers. See id.
80. See Freight Operations by Mexican Motor Carriers - Implementation of North American Free
Trade Agreement, Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 96), 10 I.C.C. 2d 854 (Nov. 30, 1995) [hereinafter
Freight Operations].
81. See id. at 3. The ICC's proposal called for identification of Mexican carriers with a Certificate
of Registration to operate in the border commercial zones to continue being identified by
"MX" numbers. "MX-E" numbers would be used to identify those who have established an
enterprise in the United States to provide truck services for transporting international cargo.
Mexican common carriers with 4-state certificates of authority would have "MX-C" numbers,
while private and contract carriers with 4-state permits would have "MX-P" numbers. See id.
82. See id. at 7.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See S. Con. Res. 36, 103d Cong. (1993). This resolution spoke to harmonizing truck safety
standards and expressed concern over the lack of hourly limits on Mexican drivers, the absence
of front brake requirements on Mexican trucks and its resultant safety risks (reduced stopping
ability and increased susceptibility to jackknifing), the lack of an integrated Mexican record
keeping system for truck drivers, and the absence of a drug and alcohol testing program. The
Senate resolved that the Secretary of Transportation should uphold all U.S. truck safety stan-
dards on these issues.
86. See Sanger, supra note 35. A Clinton political adviser said, "[aill we need is one big environ-
mental disaster, or one of these trucks plowing into a school bus, and all of a sudden NAFTA is
going to look like a pretty disastrous idea.' See id. Such a crash did occur in March of 1997,
but it apparently did not cause a national uproar. See Emily Otani, David Reyes, & Scott
Martelle, Fiery O.C. Crash Kills 4; Trucker is Held, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at Al. A Mexican-
licensed driver operating outside of the 25-mile border zone plowed into a crowd of cars that
had slowed in a construction zone, causing a fiery, nine-car crash on the Santa Ana freeway.
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The most recent audit of truck safety at the border does not reflect well upon the
overall safety of Mexican trucks crossing the border or the capabilities of those doing the
inspecting. The report by the Department of Transportation's Inspector General's office,
the first since NAFTA was implemented, states that forty-four percent of Mexican trucks
undergoing safety inspections fail. 87 The failure rate for American trucks is only twenty-
five percent. 88 Typical violations include leaking hydraulic fluids, inoperable air brakes,
malfunctioning or missing taillights, and severely worn brakes. 89 The report also said that
too few trucks are being inspected to begin with and recommended more robust inspec-
tion capabilities. 90 The report called for more'inspectors at border crossings and the gath-
ering of more safety compliance information from Mexican truck companies wanting to
operate in the United States.9 1 The situation at the El Paso station illustrates the need for
more inspectors. Only one inspector is on duty to check the 1,300 trucks that cross the
border every day.92 Typically, between ten and fourteen trucks are inspected there daily.93
D. DRUG TRAFFICKING.
Perhaps one of the greatest dilemmas facing the Administration is the dichotomy of
freer trade and drug trafficking. It seems a logical conclusion that increased commerce
resulting from a free trade agreement includes an increase in illegal trade as well.
Politically, it puts the Administration in a difficult position, trying to enjoy the fruits of
increased trade while maintaining the tough stance on drug enforcement and interdiction
that is politically necessary.
The United States has spent approximately $20 billion on international drug control
and interdiction efforts since 1988. 94 The United States has five policy goals as part of
their drug control strategy:
(1) motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse; (2) increase
the safety of U.S. citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence; (3)
Two vacationing couples were killed and three others were injured. The driver was held on
felony manslaughter charges but was later released. NAFTA opponents seized the opportunity
to reiterate support for continuing the trucking ban imposed in December of 1995. Ironically,
though unrelated, 201 members of Congress sent a letter to the President urging him to con-
tinue the trucking ban. Safety was one of the reasons cited. Teamsters President Ron Carey
said that if NAFTA truck provisions are implemented, thousands of "these ticking time bombs
will claim even more innocent lives." Id.
87. See Scott Bowles, Audit: Mexican Trucks Pose Safety Hazard, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 1999, at 3A,
available in 1999 WL 6831155.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See U.S. Checks of Trucks From Mexico Found Lacking, Report Says, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1999, at
B9 [hereinafter Checks].
91. Seeid.
92. See Bowles, supra note 87.
93. See id.
94. Benjamin F. Nelson, Drug Control-Long Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts,
GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1998. Mr. Nelson is the Director, International Relations and Trade
Issues, for the General Accounting Office (GAO) [hereinafter Drug Control]. This report was
made to the Chairman, House Subcomm. on Nat'l Security, Govt. Reform & Oversight.
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reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use; (4) shield
America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and (5) break foreign and
domestic drug sources of supply.95
The United States attempts to accomplish the final two goals in a number of ways. It
focuses on destroying major drug trafficking organizations by incarcerating their leaders and
seizing their drugs and assets.96 Its supply reduction efforts are directed at eradicating crop
cultivation. 97 The United States also attempts to aid source and transit countries by increas-
ing their political will and capabilities to fight drug trafficking activities and by making
greater use of international organizations to share the burdens and costs of these interdiction
efforts.98 Mexico is one of the major drug transit areas into the United States.99
Federal funding for these drug control efforts falls into one of four categories: (1)
demand reduction; (2) domestic law enforcement; (3) international; and (4) interdiction.10 0
The international and interdiction budgets for 1997 were $400 million and $1.4 billion
respectively. 101 In the context of NAFTA, these are the two most relevant categories.
In spite of the efforts of the United States over the past several years and the expense
of billions of dollars, the illegal drug market in the United States is amply supplied and
vibrant. 10 2 The availability of drugs in this country has not been materially reduced.103
One of the main reasons for the failure of counter-narcotics programs is the sophistica-
tion of the target organizations. 10 4 These industries quickly adapt to changes in U.S. drug
control efforts. 105 In addition, a host of factors in the producing and transit countries








102. See id. at 6. The amount of cocaine and heroin seized between 1990 and 1995 made little impact
on the availability of these drugs in the United States. Government reports estimate worldwide
annual cocaine production capabilities at 780 metric tons, while 230 metric tons was seized world-
wide. The U.S. demand is about 300 metric tons per year. Similarly, heroin production was esti-
mated at 300 metric tons per year, with corresponding seizures of approximately 32 metric tons
and an annual demand in the United States of between only 10 and 15 metric tons.
103. See id. at 4. The flow of cocaine, heroin, and other drugs into the United States remains steady,
and the availability has not been reduced. Cultivation has actually increased in Mexico, South
America, and the Caribbean between 1988 and 1995. Availability is commonly measured by
fluctuations in the price and purity of a specific drug. Depressed prices and increased purity
levels indicate an increased supply of a drug. Cocaine prices and purity levels have remained
steady since 1988. Heroin price and purity levels for a kilogram have remained steady since
1990, however, the purity level for lesser weights commonly sold on the streets has more than
doubled without a rise in price.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 3. Drug traffickers are able to acquire and employ some of the most modern techno-
logical equipment, such as global positioning systems and cellular communications technolo-
gy. Thus, their command, control, and monitoring capabilities are vastly improved and some-
times better than the governments that are operating against them. These drug organizations
are able to quickly alter their modes of operation, avoiding capture and seizure of their assets.
Even when leaders are captured, others quickly fill the void and continue operating.
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hinder counter-narcotics operations. These include economic and political policies, limit-
ed resources, internal civil unrest and terrorism, and corruption. 10 6 Many of these coun-
tries lack the political will to reduce narcotics cultivation because the illegal drug trade
contributes so much money to their economies. 107 U.S. efforts are further hampered by
its own competing foreign policy objectives (such as NAFTA), 10 8 organizational and
operational limitations, 109 inconsistent funding o10 and inadequate methods to measure
success or failure. '''
In recent years the Administration renewed its efforts towards drug eradication and
interdiction. This may be partly in response to the increased coverage of drug activities in
connection with NAFTA. Some of this added attention can be attributed to a report pub-
lished by Operation Alliance, a task force of border law enforcement officials led by the
U.S. Customs Service. The report concluded that NAFTA has increased the problem of
drug trafficking from Mexico. 112 The report argues that reduced border inspections are
making it much easier for contraband to slip through, particularly in fruit and vegetable
exports.' 13 The report also claims that drug trafficking organizations are acquiring legiti-
mate Mexican transportation companies and using them to move their drugs into the
United States. 114 Further, traffickers are employing trade consultants to advise them on
106. See id. at 4. The enormous financial resources of drug cartels enable them to corrupt officials
rather easily, especially low-level officials. In Mexico, their power rivals that of the government for
influence and control. See id. at 7. Some of the producing countries are among the poorest in the
world, and governments have insufficient resources to combat the wealth of drug organizations.
107. See id. at 8.
108. See id. at 4. For example, assistance to Bolivian farmers for the purpose of substituting soy-
beans for coca leaf crops was opposed by the Department of Agriculture. However, the
Department feared developing a potential competitor for U.S. soybean farmers. See id. at 11.
Similarly, in 1995, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico considered counter-narcotics operations its
fourth highest priority. NAFTA and other trade and commerce issues were considered more
important. See id. at 12. Unforeseen contingencies can also impact the anti-drug effort. For
example, in 1995, $45 million slated for counter-narcotics assistance was diverted to facilitate
Haiti's democratic transition. See id. at 12.
109. See id. at 12. Some examples include: competing priorities, interagency rivalries, lack of oper-
ational coordination, and inadequate staffing. In some instances, lessons learned from prior
operations were unknown or unavailable to current planners and operators. See id. at 13.
110. See id. at 14. From 1986 to 1996 approximately $103 billion was spent on domestic and inter-
national efforts to combat the drug problem in the United States. $20 billion of this was spent
on eradication of crops, alternate forms of income for drug crop farmers, foreign law enforce-
ment capabilities, and interdiction operations. Funding amounts have fluctuated from year to
year, and were declining until recently. Between 1992 and 1995, funding for interdiction
efforts in the transit zone declined from $1 billion to $570 million. Similar declines were seen
in military counter-narcotics activities and source country activities.
111. See id.
112. See Michael Allen & Laurie Hays, Mexico Drug Lords Exploit NAFTA, Report Says, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 1998, at A17. The report was a culmination of two years of research, relying heavily on
confidential sources and news clippings. Operation Alliance also surveyed law enforcement





which type of merchandise moves quickest across the border under the rules of
NAFTA. 115 The report even alleges that these drug leaders attend conferences and courses
to learn about trade issues and determine which types of cargo best conceals drugs."16
Mexican traffickers have also been linked to private companies that are instrumental in
Mexican infrastructure projects."17 In the ongoing NAFTA sound-bite war, an Operation
Alliance official called NAFTA a "deal made in narco-heaven." 118
In December of 1997, President Clinton directed the Office of Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) to develop a plan to stop the flow of drugs across the nation's border with
Mexico within five years. 119 The plan was unveiled in August of 1998; it called for the
drastic improvement of technology, intelligence gathering, and coordination of law
enforcement officials. 120 The ONDCP said cargo x-ray machines are needed at each port
of entry; fences, sensors, video cameras, and lighting must be added along the border; and
aviation support must be improved. 12 The goal of the ONDCP is not to seize drugs, but
to stop drug smuggling. Barry McCaffrey, director of the ONDCP, wants to drive the drug
smuggling trade back to the sea, where there will be less impact.122 Some of the techno-
logical advances, such as cargo x-ray machines, are in place and producing results. 123
Skeptics point out that new tools help, but success depends more on traditional
methods like informants and better cooperation from Mexican police. 124 Others point to
the ability of drug traffickers to adapt their methods and to the increase in traffic volume
at the border since NAFTA's implementation. 125 Still others say the real problem is
demand, not supply, but that is beyond the scope of this comment. 126 Regardless,
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. Mexican traffickers are, not surprisingly, very interested in upgrading their country's air
links, marine ports, highways, and railroad systems as they relate to U.S. commercial shipping.
See id.
118. Tracy Eaton, NAFTA Seen as a Boon to Drug Trade, BUFFALO NEWS, May 11, 1998, at A4 (quot-
ing former high-level DEA official Phil Jordan). Jordan claims that while at DEA, he was
under strict orders not to say anything negative about free trade. See id.
119. See Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton Seeks to Stop Flow of Drugs at Mexican Border, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1997, at A3.
120. See Marisa Taylor, Anti-Drug Smuggling Plan Unveiled-The U.S. Policy Chief Aims to Improve
Law Enforcement Coordination and Technology at the U.S.-Mexico Border, FT. WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Aug. 26, 1998. More efficient use of personnel and resources is crucial to the
ONDCP plan. The plan calls for a regional drug czar in El Paso to coordinate law enforcement
efforts between the twenty-two agencies involved. See id. Additionally, coordinators are pro-
posed at the thirty-nine official points of entry along the southwest border. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See David LaGesse, Drug Battle Going High-Tech: Customs Service Testing, Installing New
Detection Devices, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 22, 1998, at 45A. A suspicious looking tractor-
trailer was inspected by one of the giant x-ray machines in Pharr, Texas. The inspection lasted
only ten minutes and saved agents the effort of drilling holes in the trailer to search for hidden
compartments. See id.
124. See id.
125: See Shogren, supra note 119.
126. See id. (quoting Roberto Martinez, head of American Friends Service Committee Border
Project, an immigrant rights group).
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President Clinton is not likely to reduce restrictions on cross-border travel with Mexico
because the political gain would not outweigh the political cost. President Clinton would
be perceived as not being tough enough in the war on drugs.
E. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PRESSURES IN DELAYING
WIDER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAFTA MOTOR CARRIER PROVISIONS.
Mounting evidence points to the possibility that election-year politics played a large
role in delaying the border opening. Two of the more important Clinton administration
constituencies (labor unions and environmentalists) were strongly opposed to the provision
providing Mexican trucks freer access to American highways. 127 Texas and California, two
of the states with the larger number of electoral votes, would be directly affected by such an
opening.128 The Administration faced domestic political pressure to prevent the opening of
the southern border states in December of 1995 from opponents of NAFTA. The
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters) have lobbied against the border open-
ing since NAFTA's passage. 129 The Teamsters also filed suit in-Washington to block the bor-
der opening. 130 However, the Administration announced their decision to delay implemen-
tation of the motor carrier provisions before a hearing could be held in the Teamsters
suit. 13 1 Recent evidence uncovered in a Senate report on campaign fundraising shows high-
level meetings between Administration and Teamsters officials on the trucking issue. 132
Some argue that the Administration received significant man-hours in campaign work and
financial contributions as a result of NAFTA's trucking decision. 133
. Similarly, Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH) lobbied for lower weight
limits on Mexican trucks and a freeze on increases in allowable hours of service per day. 134
127. See Sanger, supra note 35.
128. See id. Typical of the vocal opposition, Texas Attorney General Dan Morales voiced complaints
that the Federal government had not done an adequate job of ensuring that Mexican trucks
coming into Texas would be safe. "We do not want the cries and screams of disaster to be the
wake up call for the Federal government .... These unsafe and uninsured cargo trucks are a
travelling calamity waiting to happen." Id.
129. See id.
130. See Cooper, supra note 34. The union emphasized safety issues but it was clear that the
Teamsters also feared the impact that low-wage Mexican drivers might have on American jobs.
See id.
131. See Sanger, supra note 35.
132. See Paul A. Gigot, Chile Con Carey: What Bill Did for the Teamsters, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1998, at
A14. Notes prepared by White House adviser Harold Ickes said the Clinton administration is
"in a good position to rekindle the Teamsters leadership's enthusiasm for the Administration..
• . [b]ut they have some parochial issues that we need to work on." Id. A memo from a
Teamster political director, William Hamilton, makes reference to a meeting with Vice-
President Gore and their discussion of Mexican trucking. See id. Another Hamilton memo
lists favors performed by the White House, one of which was "stopped the NAFTA border
crossings" Id.
133. See id.
134. See Alex Binkley, Safety in the NAFTA Zone; CRASH Pushes for Lower Weight Limits as Trucking
Rules are Harmonized, TRAFFIC WORLD, June 15, 1998, at 21.
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One official said, "public safety must not be sacrificed for any so-called harmonization that
does not adhere to the truck safety standards set by the U.S. government."' 35
Food safety came to the forefront in 1997 when 179 Michigan school children con-
tracted hepatitis after eating tainted Mexican strawberries.136 The incident was fodder for
opponents of NAFTA and fast-track negotiating authority for the President. 137 The
increase in trade volume and the inability of inspectors to stop more than one percent of
incoming trucks for inspection led to fears of more contaminated food incidents and a
general belief that NAFTA and similarly brokered trade deals (such as would be possible
with fast-track negotiating authority) may have unwelcome consequences.138
Mexican officials faced a great deal of political pressure as well. Mexican trucking
companies, fearing that open competition with larger American trucking companies will
cause their businesses to suffer, lobbied for delaying the implementation of the new
rules. 139 The Mexican companies were already suffering financially due to the peso
crisis. 140 President Zedillo insulated an important sector of the Mexican economy from
135. Id. (quoting Michael Scippa). Political opponents of NAFTA and President Clinton were well
aware of the political value of the trucking dispute. Republican presidential candidate Patrick
Buchanan said, "[t]he first time there is an accident with one of these Mexican trucks, over-
loaded and with an unqualified driver, there literally will be hell to pay with the American peo-
ple.' Cooper, supra note 34. Teamsters spokesman Craig Merrilees echoed that sentiment,
"[tlhe first time a Mexican truck plows into a school bus, people will be asking how did this
happen and who's responsible." Greenberger, supra note 37. Note the similarity between
Teamsters and Clinton administration examples, supra note 86.
136. See Heated Debate Continues on NAFTA, 143 CONG. REC. H5924-01, (daily ed. July 29, 1997)
(comments of Rep. Brown).
137. See id. Congressman Brown used the politically effective tactic of connecting child safety and
family safety to express his support for tougher food safety precautions. See also Karen Olssori,
We Must Eat, Drink and (Still) Be Wary, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1998, at Cl. The author refers to
the testimony of Mary Ellen Camrie, a food science professor involved in the government
investigation, that workers "relieved themselves, then went right back to work using their bare
hands to twist the caps off the strawberries.' Id. The possibility of the link between bare hands
and the outbreak demonstrate the dynamics involved in the spread of bacteria and the difficul-
ty of keeping watch over possible contamination points.
138. See Making Our Food Safer, 143 CONG. REC. H9545-03, (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1997) (comments of
Rep. Brown).
139. See Sanger, supra note 35.
140. See id. Mexico's peso crisis culminated in a 35% devaluation of the peso in December of 1994.
The Mexican economy had been plagued by inflation and currency devaluations since the
1970s that had hindered the country's economic development. See Douglas W. Arner, The
Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Markets, 2 NAFTA: L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 28, 33 (Fall 1996). Since 1988, Mexico put in place economic reforms in order to
make its economy more open, efficient, and competitive. See id. With NAFTA and Mexico's
entry into the Organization for Economic Development (OECD), investor confidence soared.
Foreign investment in Mexico also rose dramatically. However, much of this inflow was in the
form of equity and debt portfolio investments that could be quickly withdrawn if investor con-
fidence waned. See id. at 34. Rebel uprisings in Chiapas and the assassination of Presidential
candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio led to a drop in Mexican currency reserves. See id. President
Salinas ordered the treasury to use the currency reserves to keep the peso stable. See Tod
Robberson, Mexico's Meltdown; A Country at a Crossroads: How a Miracle Went Wrong; Political
Setbacks, Economic Miscalculations, and Bad Luck Led to Crash, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1995, at
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further harm and scored political points by delaying the border opening. 14 1 In fact, the
president of Mexico's national trucking association, Canacar, recently said there is no rush
to open the U.S.-Mexico border for international trucking. 142 In short, neither President
Clinton nor President Zedillo feels enough political heat from domestic or international
sources to force a resolution to the trucking dispute.
F. CURRENT STATE OF DISPUTE.
Progress in the trucking dispute has been slow. American and Mexican officials have
engaged in periodic consultations since December of 1995, but little substantive progress
has been made. The governors of the respective American and Mexican border states have
publicly urged the Clinton administration to move forward on the border opening.' 43
The United States has attempted to link resolution of the trucking dispute to other trade
issues, such as the ongoing small-package delivery dispute. 144 Mexican law restricts the
operation of American small-package delivery services.' 45 Another issue politically linked
to the trucking dispute is Mexico's move to delay the opening of the border to regularly
scheduled American bus service.' 46 Access to Mexico is a key issue to the success of
A24. In early December, the reserves were down to $14 billion. Another uprising panicked
investors further, and in mid-December, when the reserves were down to $7 billion, President
Zedillo announced the devaluation. See id. In January of 1995, President Clinton announced
$20 billion in U.S. loan guarantees and $48.8 billion in the form of a multilateral aid package.
Under this package, $20 billion came from the U.S., $17.8 billion from the IMF, and $1 billion
from Canada. See Arner, supra note 140, at 38.
141. See Sanger, supra note 33.
142. See Daniel J. McCosh, No Need to Expedite Border Opening, Group President Says, J. COM., July
6, 1999, at 14. Canacar President Miguel Quintanilla cited fears of Mexican trucking compa-
nies that drivers would abandon vehicles in search of better work opportunities in the United
States and the age of the Mexican truck fleet on average. See id.
143. See U.S., Mexican Border Governors Urge U.S. Opening to Mexican Trucks, AM. TRADE, June 12,
1997, at 6. A draft letter prepared by the ten border governors said that the failure to open the
border runs contrary to the spirit and intent of NAFTA and that the American border states
are taking "extraordinary steps" to ensure that Mexican trucks and drivers are meeting the
standards mandated by the Federal Government. See id.
144. See U.S. Awaits Mexican Response to its Linkage of Transport Issues, AM. TRADE, June 26, 1997, at
11. Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater sent a letter to Carlos Ruiz Sacristan, his Mexican
equivalent, stating that the United States expects to seek resolution of several long-standing
issues alongside the resolution of the border crossing dispute. Those issues include driver and
vehicle safety and small-package delivery services See id.
145. See Martha Brannigan, UPS Cancels Land Service to Mexico, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1995, at A2.
UPS cited "[blurdensome customs procedures and protectionist regulatory practices" as rea-
sons for canceling their land service. Id. Gina Ellrich, a UPS spokeswoman, said there are two
major problems with Mexico's treatment of UPS. First, customs agents must inspect every
package crossing the border, and second, Mexico has been stonewalling in issuing permits for
UPS to operate tractor-trailers for deliveries within Mexico. See id. As a result, deliveries are
contracted out to Mexican companies, raising UPS' operating costs. See id.
146. See U.S., Mexico to Make New Stab at Solving NAFTA Trucking Dispute, AM. TRADE, Feb. 5,
1998, at 1, 2 [hereinafter New Stab].
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American bus operators, but Mexico has resisted these efforts claiming that the matters
are unrelated. 147
In January of 1998, Mexican and American officials agreed to a new series of discus-
sions to try to resolve the trucking dispute. 148 Mexico had been threatening to seek a dis-
pute settlement panel under NAFTA to resolve the dispute. 149 By July of 1998, Mexico
had taken two of the three required steps to initiate a dispute settlement case under chap-
ter 20 of NAFTA; formal consultations and a meeting of trade ministers. 150 The formal
consultations took place on August 19, 1998.151 The issue was not resolved, but Mexican
officials said that the gap between the two sides had narrowed as a result.152 United States
officials were not as optimistic, simply stating that no conclusions were drawn and that
the parties would continue discussions. 153 After the required thirty-day period elapsed
following these consultations, Mexico announced it was taking the final step by request-
ing a dispute settlement panel under chapter 20 of NAFTA. 154 From the Mexican view-
point, no clear message on the safety issues was ever conveyed by the United States.
Discussions continue between the United States and Mexico and officials continue to
announce they are "working with the government of Mexico" to assure that Mexican
trucks can operate safely and that U.S. border inspection facilities are ready, but substan-
tive progress is still lacking. 155 A confidential draft of a national safety action plan for the
years 1999-2003 targets bringing Mexican trucks in line with U.S. safety standards in
2001.156 The four action items said necessary to achieve this goal are improving regulato-
ry compatibility; developing and operating an information exchange system; establishing
a grant of operating authority process; and increasing enforcement and compliance.157
147. See Allen R. Myerson, Despite Pact, Buses Face Border Barrier, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at D4.
The United States bus market has been stagnant. Americans rely on buses for travel over 100
miles only two percent of the time, totaling approximately twenty-five to thirty million bus
trips per year. See id. In contrast, Mexicans make approximately 250 million bus trips per
year, relying on buses for ninety-eight percent of trips over 100 miles. See id.
148. See New Stab, supra note 146.
149. See id. at 2.
150. See Mexico Fights U.S. on Access for Buses, Trucks Under NAFTA Rules, AM. TRADE, Aug. 6, 1998,
at 3. On July 24, 1998, Mexico announced that it had called for formal NAFTA consultations
and requested a meeting of the trade ministers from the three NAFTA countries to discuss the
ongoing trucking dispute between Mexico and the United States. See id. Luis De Calle, the
Director of Mexico's NAFTA Office in Washington, said that Mexico wanted to move from
informal to formal communications on the issue because it felt that the United States had
never fully explained its policy of not opening the border to Mexican trucks. See id.
151. See Mexican Official Says Progress Achieved in Truck Consultations, AM. TRADE, Aug. 20, 1998, at
1,6.
152. See id. at 1.
153. See id.
154. See Mexico Demands NAFTA Panel As It Delays Other Disputes With U.S., AM. TRADE, Oct. 1,
1998, at 4. Despite the formal procedures pursued, Mexico expresses its willingness to find a
negotiated solution and avoid the formal dispute settlement procedures.
155. Briefs, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 19, 1999, at 23 (quoting Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater).
156. See Confidential Draft Sees Mexican Cross-Border Truck Traffic by 2001, AM. TRADE, Apr. 8, 1999,
at 3.
157. See id.
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IV. Effects of the Trucking Dispute on NAFTA as a Whole.
A. NAFTA EXPANSION EFFORTS.
The trucking dispute with Mexico is an example of the conditions that will hamper
any expansion of NAFTA to include other nations, such as Chile. Article 2204 of NAFTA
provides for the possible future expansion of the pact to include other nations. 158
Though NAFTA is young, NAFTA member countries have already sought to expand its
ranks. In December of 1994, the leaders from thirty-four Western Hemisphere nations
convened in Miami, Florida at the Summit of the Americas. 15 9 The conference resulted in
a call for the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year
2005.160 The FTAA is intended to use existing regional and bilateral agreements "in order
to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic integration and to bring the agreements
together."' 6 1 It was at this Summit that President Clinton, on behalf of NAFTA member
nations, extended an invitation to Chile to join NAFTA. 162
Surprisingly, five years later, little progress has been made towards the goal of Chilean
accession. The obstacles to Chilean accession are products of the American political system,
not any failures or shortcomings on Chile's part. President Clinton's inability to obtain fast-
track negotiating authority from Congress is the largest impediment to accession talks.
Enthusiasm for NAFTA among congressional members has waned since its passage in 1994.
Congressional leaders are reluctant to grant fast-track authority to the President for NAFTA
expansion talks due to displeasure over some of NAFTA's consequences to date, such as the
motor carrier provisions that are central to the trucking dispute.163 Some congressional
members fear giving away their ability to protect American workers and the environment,
two of the biggest areas of contention with NAFTA.' 64 Yet, Chile will not negotiate for
NAFTA accession unless President Clinton has fast-track authority.165 In fact, U.S. Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky omitted the negotiation of a free trade agreement with
Chile from her trade agenda for 1999 because the President does not have fast-track negoti-
ating authority. 66 Some officials feel that if fast-track authority is not granted this year, it
will be 2001 or 2002 before it is possible.167 Without fast-track authority, the United States
may not be taken seriously by potential trade partners, and it risks a more aggressive trading
move into the Americas by the EU. 168
158. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2204,32 I.L.M. 605, 702 (1993).
159. See Helen Cooper & Jose de Cordoba, Chile is Invited to Join NAFTA as U.S. Pledges Free Trade
Zone for Americas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at A3.
160. See id.
161. Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 34 I.L.M.
808,811.
162. See Cooper & Cordoba, supra note 159.
163. See Fast Track Authority, 143 CONG. REC. H 10328 (1997) (remarks of Mr. Pallone).
164. See id. at H10331.
165. See id. at H10328.
166. See Jim Landers, The Road Ahead-NAFTA Still Has A Ways to Go Before Full Implementation,




Fast-track legislation allows the President to negotiate international trade agreements for
a limited period of time. The President then submits the final agreement to Congress, which
then votes for or against the agreement in its entirety. 16 9 Under the normal constitutional pro-
cedure, Congress is able to modify and amend the agreement before voting on it.170
In the interim, Chile suspended talks on NAFTA accession and reached an agreement
for associate membership in the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). 17 1
Soon thereafter, Chile also successfully negotiated for membership in the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC).' 72 Chile's actions reflect a growing impatience with the
United States' internal political squabbles that affect its ability to negotiate international
trade agreements. This effect can be traced back to the perceived shortcomings of
NAFTA, such as the provisions that led to the current trucking dispute. Congress does not
want to grant broad authority to the President and be presented with swiftly negotiated,
flawed trade agreements, as many see NAFTA.173 The result, as supporters of fast-track
authority see it, is a detrimental impact on American influence and leadership in the
world and the President's ability to promote the interests of the United States abroad. 174
B. POLITICAL FALLOUT.
Domestically, President Clinton has received significant political mileage out of the
trucking dispute. It was clear how the trucking decision could benefit President Clinton
and the Democratic Party in the 1996 election year; however, this does not explain the
continued refusal to move on the issue. Some contend that given the scandals that contin-
ue to plague the Clinton White House, he cannot afford to upset powerful constituencies,
such as organized labor. 175 Additionally, there has been no political groundswell from
Clinton opponents calling for implementation of the trucking provisions. 176 The political
landscape has literally been dominated for over a year with the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal
and the impeachment of the President. The most significant international political events
have concerned peace initiatives, such as the agreement reached between Israel and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization in October of 1998, the Northern Ireland peace talks,
the Balkan crisis, and the showdown with Iraq over weapons inspections. Consequently,
the Mexican trucking dispute has a lot of competition for the limelight and this
Administration is not likely to suffer serious political damage by not resolving it.
169. See Robert Mosbacher, The Americas: U.S. Exporters to Latin America Need Fast-Track, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 12, 1997, at A23.
170. See Melissa Ann Miller, Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Chile's Accession to the NAFTA and the
Fast-Track Debate, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 153, 154 (1996).
171. See Brandy A. Bayer, Expansion of NAFTA: Issues and Obstacles Regarding Accession by Latin
American States and Associations, 26 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 615, 636 (1997).
172. See id.
173. See Fast Track Authority, supra note 163, at 10331.
174. See Mosbacher, supra note 169, at A23.
175. See Gigot, supra note 132.
176. See Cooper, supra note 34.
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V. Conclusion.
The trucking dispute between Mexico and the United States does not seem to be a
hotly contested dispute at all. It is a major obstacle to the full implementation of NAFTA,
but neither Mexico nor the United States seem intent on resolving the dispute. Mexico
has already reaped great rewards from NAFTA in terms of investment in its economy,
while the United States has enjoyed some success as well. However, the strong political
and economic factors facing both countries that stand in the way of a resolution to this
dispute may be too difficult to overcome.
The Clinton administration faces strong opposition on the implementation of the
trucking provisions from some of its strongest constituencies, organized labor and envi-
ronmental groups. These groups effectively use the spectre of unsafe trucks wreaking
havoc on America's highways and of environmental disasters close to our borders.
Additionally, the Administration is caught between a rock and a hard place on the drug
interdiction issue. The United States must maintain a strong position supporting a crack
down on drug smuggling through the U.S.-Mexico border. The means necessary to
accomplish this goal are counterproductive to the means necessary to fully implement
NAFTA's trucking provisions and open the border to unrestricted truck travel.
The trucking dispute is one of many factors acting to affect the stature of the United
States in the world trade regime and the expansion of NAFTA to include other nations
such as Chile. Without fast-track negotiating authority for President Clinton, some
nations are reluctant to negotiate international trade agreements. Nations fear negotiating
deals twice-once with the President and then again with the modified agreement after
Congress works on it. In a related issue, this dilemma points to possible weaknesses in
granting fast-track negotiating authority to the President. Opponents can argue that lack
of foresight and eagerness to "get a deal done" led to the current problems under NAFTA.
Regardless, until the political landscape or the balance of the benefits that NAFTA
has brought to the United States and Mexico changes dramatically, the trucking dispute
between the two countries will likely remain unresolved. It is an important issue within
NAFTA and one that could affect full implementation of the agreement over the years,
but it is not significantly painful enough to either side currently to draw the attention it
demands for resolution.
